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Razzaque (2009) studied the role of gender in the ultimatum game by running 
experiments on students in various cities in Pakistan. He used standard confirmatory data 
analysis techniques, which work well in familiar contexts, where relevant hypotheses of 
interest are known in advance. Our goal in this paper is to demonstrate that exploratory data 
analysis is much better suited to the study of experimental data where the goal is to discover 
patterns of interest. Our exploratory re-analysis of the original data set of Razzaque (2009) 
leads to several new insights. While we re-confirm the main finding of Razzaque regarding the 
greater generosity of males, additional analysis suggests that this is driven by student sub-
culture in Pakistan, and would not generalise to the population at large. In addition, we find  
strong effect of urbanisation. Our exploratory data analysis also offers considerable additional 
insights into the learning process that takes place over the course of a sequence of games.  
JEL Classification:  C78, C81, C91, J16 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of the twenty first century, thousands of papers have been 
published on the Ultimatum Game (UG) because it clearly demonstrates the social 
aspects of decision making in the simplest context possible. In the UG, two players share 
some money according to a simple set of rules. The proposer is given an amount of 
money—say $10—to share with the responder. The proposer makes an offer (i.e. I keep 
$7 and you get $3). If the Respondent accepts, both get the proposed allocation. If 
respondent rejects then both get $0.  
Economic theory leads to a straightforward solution to this game. The proposer 
will maximise utility by keeping $9 and offering the minimal possible amount, $1. 
Economic theory predicts that the responder will accept this offer, since $1 is better than 
$0. However, experimental results are strongly in conflict with economic theory. The vast 
majority of responders reject offers of less than 20 percent, regarding them as unfair. 
They are willing to suffer a loss, to punish the unfair behaviour of the proposer. Knowing 
this, the vast majority of proposers offer more than the minimal amount, typically above 
30 percent of the total. Thus, both proposer and responder  strategies differ greatly from 
the theoretical Nash equilibrium strategy. Behaviour in the ultimatum game reflects 
cultural norms related to sharing and perceptions of fairness. Because of this aspect, 
experiments on this game have been conducted in a vast variety of different cultural 
contexts. Camerer (2003) provides a convenient summary of the voluminous literature. 
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Some materials especially relevant to our topic are also surveyed in Razzaque (2009) and 
Zataari and Trivers (2007). 
In this context, we re-analyse an experimental study originally conducted by 
Razzaque (2009) to  explore gender differences in the ultimatum game. Our main goal is 
to show that how exploratory data analysis techniques allow for detection of unusual 
patterns in data. Our analysis also highlights how local cultural patterns among students 
drive most of the results, which are very different from standard results on effects of 
gender in the UG.  
EDA—exploratory data analysis—is generally not taught to students of 
econometrics, we note two key points about it. First, the object of an EDA is to generate 
interesting hypotheses; to find patterns in the data which are worth investigating or 
exploring further. The standard package of techniques taught in econometrics textbooks 
consists of Confirmatory Data Analysis (CDA), which is done when hypotheses are in 
hand and the goal is to prove or disprove them.  EDA is often used to supplement CDA 
rather than replacing it; however, CDA without EDA is seldom warranted [Behrens 
(1997)]. EDA provides useful insights, and picks up unexpected or misleading patterns 
even if we have well defined hypotheses at hand. Small samples are not a serious 
handicap to an EDA, since our goal is not to find significant evidence for or against a 
hypothesis, but to generate them. The second point is that use of relevant graphical 
techniques is much more suited to the discovery of patterns. The patterns in the data stand 
out visually in the boxplots, and are hidden in the tables or in formal models. 
Detailed description of the experiment is provided in Razzaque (2009). We 
summarise the elements relevant to our analysis briefly. Equal numbers of male and 
female students were selected from universities in five cities to participate as subjects in 
the experiments. There were fifteen pairs each in Ghizer, Kharan, Rawla Kot and 
Nawabshah, and ten pairs in Lahore, for a total of 65 males and 65 females. The first two 
rounds were blind and anonymous, so as to establish a baseline and to allow all students 
to play as Proposers and as Responders. The third and fourth rounds were played by 
matched couples. Males were proposers in the third round while females were 
responders. The roles were reversed in the fourth round. This design creates a 
confounding effect, since the effects of reciprocity and gender cannot be disentangled. 
Nonetheless, the experiment yields a substantial amount of interesting information. 
Parallel to Razzaque, we do an analysis of the results for each of the four rounds.     
 
Offers in Round 1 
Razzaque (2009) finds that the pattern of offers of males in the first round 
differs significantly from that of females. He also finds that the males make larger 
offers—i.e. they are more generous. This is rather surprising since the typical finding 
is the reverse of this; females are found to be more generous, and make larger offers. 
A detailed analysis reveals much more variation, and interesting patterns in the data. 
One of the key results that emerges from this analysis is that the behaviour of 
students in the small cities (Ghizer, Kharan and Rawla Kot) differs significantly from 
that of the larger cities, Nawabshah and Lahore. We first provide a tabulated 
summary of the data, which is a typical data summary produced by standard 
statistical packages. 
 Gender and Ultimatum in Pakistan  3 
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics for First Round Offers 
City Gender N Mean SE(M) StDev Min Med Max 
Ghizer F 15 36.2 1.7 6.6 25 37 45 
Ghizer M 15 40.8 0.7 2.7 35 41 45 
Kharan F 15 35.1 2.2 8.4 23 37 47 
Kharan M 15 41.6 0.7 2.8 35 42 45 
Rawla Kot F 15 34 2.5 9.5 18 37 45 
Rawla Kot M 15 40.8 0.7 2.7 35 41 45 
Nawab Shah F 15 43 1.7 6.4 33 42 55 
Nawab Shah M 15 39.3 2.1 8.3 25 41 51 
Lahore  F 5 43 4.4 9.8 30 50 50 
Lahore  M 5 39 4 8.9 30 40 50 
Small Cities F 45 35.1 0.604 8.098 10 40 55 
Small Cities M 45 41.1 0.549 7.363 30 45 65 
Big Cities F 20 43.0 1.513 13.533 10 46 100 
Big Cities M 20 39.2 0.709 6.339 25 46 55 
 
Although the patterns that we detect with the boxplot are present in the numbers 
above, it would require some detective work to find them. However, a boxplot of the data 
makes these patterns visually obvious, as we can see from the graphs given below. 
 
Fig. 1.  Boxplot of First Round Offers 
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It is immediately obvious visually that male offers in Ghizer, Kharan and Rawala 
Kot are quite similar to each other, and very different from all other offer patterns. These 
offers are tightly concentrated around 40 percent. Male offers in the big cities (Lahore 
and Nawab Shah) also average around 40 percent, but are much more spread out. Male 
offers differ in small and big cities in terms of variation but not in terms of mean. Female 
offers show the opposite picture. The mean offer of females is 35 percent, or about 5 
percent lower than that of males in the small cities. In the big cities, the mean offer is 
around 43 percent or about 3 percent higher than that of the males. The spread or 
variation of the female offers does not show any significant differences  among big and 
small cities.  
Our observation of behavioural differences for  geographical background or 
urbanisation  were significant in many previous studies; specifically, Barr (2014) shows 
that urban-born player makes higher offers in the UG, while rural-born player  is less 
certain about sharing norms in UG. Similarly, Paciotti and Hadley (2003) also argued that 
ethnicity has a greater effect on offers and rejections than individual economic and 
demographic characteristics. Oosterbeek, Sloof, and Van De Kuilen (2004), on the 
contrary, found significant differences in respondents’ behaviours instead of offers across 
regions. Botelho, et al. (2000), on the contrary, found geographic variable as irrelevant.  
 
Offers in Round 2 
Of course a key question is: why do these differences exist? Before attempting an 
answer, it is useful to look at the pattern of offers in round 2. Below are the boxplots for 
the male offers. 
 
Fig. 2.  Boxplot of Male Offers in Stage 1 and Stage 2 
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Because both rounds one and two were conducted under anonymity, there should 
have been no systematic difference in the results. However, observations turned out 
differently. In all three small cities, the male offers spread out over a wider range, while 
the mean remains the same at around 40 percent (Table 1 in Appendix). The spread of 
these offers is similar to the spread of the offers in all other cases. From the brief 
interviews conducted it seemed that the male students relaxed, and became more 
comfortable with game environment—a “game learning effect”. It seems plausible that in 
small cities, male students suffered from performance anxiety on initial contact in 
environments where they were together with females as subjects in an experiment. Roth 
and Erev (1995) in their learning model also showed that small initial differences 
between subjects become larger as subjects gain experience with the UG. However, big 
cities in our sample did not show any learning effect.  In Nawab Shah, there is no change 
in the male offers. In Lahore, there is dramatic shift upwards in the offers. Exploring this, 
we find from the experimenter that due to an accident, the male subjects in Lahore learnt 
that their offers were going to females. This clearly caused a dramatic shift upwards in 
the male offers. Again there was a strong and clear response to gender; males increased 
their offers hugely. While the pattern and its explanation seem clear  through an analysis 
via boxplots, similar patterns are very hard to find and explain in standard regression 
analyses run on aggregated data. Indeed, there is no mention of these patterns in the 
original analysis of Razzaque. Again this highlights the merits of an exploratory data 
analysis.  Next we look at the analysis of the female offers in round 2. The boxplots are 
presented below: 
 
Fig. 3.  Boxplot of Female Offers in Stage 1 and Stage 2 
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There is not much change in female offers in moving from round 1 to round 2. The 
means in the small cities remain at 35 percent, well below male mean offers of 40 
percent. In Lahore and Nawab Shah, the mean offers of the females remain the same, 
around 43 percent.  This is as one would expect, given that there is little change in 
conditions going from round 1 to round 2. Whereas female offers were more generous 
than males in the big cities, this pattern no longer holds in Lahore because of the gender 
revelation which occurred to males in Lahore. The Lahore offers jumped in response to 
this, making it appear as if females are less generous. However, this pattern of hyper fair 
offers is highly unusual, and would likely not be observed in cultural contexts other than 
cross-gender interactions among students.  
An important finding of the first two rounds, when UG was played in 
anonymity, is that female proposers remained less generous than the male proposers, 
even if we exclude the Lahore data where male proposers by experimental error 
proposed hyper fair amounts. This is contrary to typical finding that females are more 
generous [Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001); Eckel and Grossman (2001); Piper and 
Schnepf (2008); Naeem and Zaman (2013)] also show that Pakistani females are 
more generous in giving charity. This creates a puzzle: why are females in small 
cities offering significantly less than their counterparts in the big cities? The small 
offer of females is contrary to both local cultural patterns, as well as typical findings 
of greater generosity of females. Again a plausible explanation stems from the 
finding of Croson and Gneezy (2009) and Della Vigna, et al. (2013) that females are 
more prone to social norms and social pressure and so they react more to such 
phenomenon. In small cities where cross gender interactions are not frequent, 
females are wary and on their guard in an experimental environment where they are 
interacting with male students. We saw that males in the small cities were also not 
comfortable in making offers, though the effect of male offers vanished in the second 
round. In large cities, cross gender interaction is a commonplace, so females behave 
normally in such environments.   
 
Responder Behaviour in Rounds 1 and 2 
Regarding responder behaviour, Razzaque (2009) uses logistic regressions to 
come to conclusions similar to what we observe, using EDA methods. However, a 
direct data analysis of the type that we do here provides clear evidence, since it is not 
based on unnecessary auxiliary assumptions required by more formal statistical 
methods. In analysing the behaviour of responders, a straightforward analysis shows 
that there are no significant differences by gender or by city or by round. In fact the 
responders’ behaviour is very clear: All offers of less than 33 percent are rejected in 
both rounds. All offers of above 37 percent are accepted in both rounds. Only in the 
very narrow range of offers between 33 to 37 percent do we see any differences in 
rejection behaviours. Among the total of 260 offers in the two rounds (130 each per 
round), only 33 offers lie within  critical range of 33 percent to 37 percent.   Within 
these 33 offers, there are exactly 6 rejections; the remaining 27 offers are accepted. 
There are no significant differences in behaviour of responders by gender or by city 
or any other observable factor. 
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Fig. 4.  Bar-plot of Decisions in Stage 1 and Stage 2 
 
 
We can be misled if we look at overall rejection rates, instead of focusing on the 
critical region of 33 percent–37 percent. For example, in small cities, the median offer of 
females is around 35 percent which lies within this critical region. The median offer of 
males is around 40 percent, which lies above this region. Thus, even though responder 
behaviour is identical, overall rejection of female offers would be higher than overall 
rejection of male offers. For example, 30 out of 48 rejections in small cities are by 
females—the rejection ratio is 62.5 percent for female responders compared to 
18/48=37.5 percent for male responders. But within these 48 rejected offers, 39 originate 
from females. Also, the experimental design is such that in the second round there are 
only FF and MM pairings, while in the first round FF and FM pairings are approximately 
equal in number. Among the 130 offers made to females, 35 are made by males, while 95 
are made by females.   Thus the dramatic difference of 62.5 percent for female rejections 
compared to only 37.5 percent for males is not due to any differences in responder 
behaviour by gender. It is due to a combination of two factors. Females offer less, and the 
experimental design is such that FF pairings are 95/130 = 73 percent of total pairings 
with female responders.    
Given that responder behaviour is identical across genders and cities, we can 
directly plot the probabilities of rejection of offers from the data on the 260 offers as 
follows: 
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Fig. 5.  Acceptance Probability 
 
 
Empirically, probability of acceptance of an offer of 32 percent is zero, while at 38 
percent the probability climbs to 100 percent. Within this range, we look at the data for 
the rejection rates and use linear interpolation. This data-based curve is better than the 
logistic curve plotted to the same data by Razzaque (2009) because it does not impose an 
arbitrary functional form.  
 
Learning from Experience  
Over the course of a repeated sequence of games, people learn from experience. 
We examine how subjects learn in going from round 1 to round 2 of the ultimatum game 
under study. We only consider how the proposers learn; the question of how responders 
learn is very complicated and cannot be considered here—see Camerer (2003) for some 
discussion of this issue. If the offer of the proposers is too low, it will be rejected. 
Learning means that the proposers should raise their offers to prevent rejections in the 
future. If the proposer keeps the same offer, or lowers it, then he or she has failed to learn 
from the rejection. If the offer of the proposer is high enough, it will be accepted. In this 
case, profit maximisation means that the proposer should keep the offer the same, or else 
lower it, trying to keep a bigger share. Lowering the offer corresponds to experimenting 
to see if you can make a bigger profit. Increasing the offer corresponds to not learning, 
since acceptance of the current offer means that the same offer should also be acceptable 
in the future. Making the same offer will generate a larger share for the proposer, while 
an increased offer will lead to a smaller share. In light of these considerations, the 
following graph looks at the difference D = Offer(1)—Offer(2) on the y-axis, plotted 
against Offer(1) on the x-axis. The rejected Offers(1) are plotted as stars, while the 
accepted Offers(1) are plotted as solid dots: 
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Fig. 6.  Scatter Plot of First Round Offers with Of1-Of2
 
 
Region A: Rejected Offer is decreased—shows lack of learning. Region B: 
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So this seems to suggest the females learned more, as Razzaque (2009) writes. In fact, of 
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their offers upwards, leading to a learning percentage of 5/6= 83 percent. Of the 21 
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only 13/21=62 percent. The sample size is too small to  derive firm conclusions, but the 
null hypothesis that females and males learn equally from rejections cannot be rejected. 
The stronger tendency of learning in rejected offers in our experiment can be attributed to 
loss-aversion [Kahneman and Tversky (1979)].   
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upper half corresponds to learning, where the accepted offer is reduced. The lower half 
corresponds to failure to learn, where the accepted offer is increased. There are a few 
outliers in the upper right quadrant corresponding to the hyper fair offers made by males 
in Lahore. In general the graph shows that there is no learning from acceptances, and that 
this tendency is also equal among males and females. In an experiment, Brenner and 
Vriend (2003) show that high general acceptance leads to significantly lower offers. 
Slonim and Roth (1998) in a high stake experiment also find that proposers learned to 
make lower offers with experience;  however, our experiment does not show this learning 
effect—acceptances do not lead to lower offers. This may be because there was too little 
time—too few rounds were played. Also, only the first two rounds could really be 
considered  to judge learning effects, because the face-to-face with opposite gender 
created a vastly different environment. Analysing the learning by gender, we find that 
among the 59 accepted offers of males, only 24 decreased their offers, leading to a 
learning ratio of 24/59 = 40 percent. If offers are changed at random than  they would be 
increased by 50 percent, implying that there is no learning going on at all.  Similarly, 16 
out of 42 females with accepted offers decreased their offers, again showing no learning. 
There is no difference by gender or city in learning from acceptances.   
 
Analysis of Rounds 3 and 4 
 
Third Round Male Offers 
The third and fourth rounds were played by matched pairs sitting across the table, 
but not allowed to communicate in any other way. In the third round, all males made 
offers to females, while in the fourth round, the roles were reversed.  We first consider 
the offers in the third round, all of which are male offers by the design of the experiment. 
In the first two rounds, male offers averaged around 41 percent in both rounds and 
in all cities—the solitary exception was Lahore in round 2, which has an average male 
offer of 50 percent, due to accidental revelation of gender of responders. In the third 
round, average male offers increased to 49 percent, in all cities, which shows a strong and 
significant response to gender. Again, the solitary exception was Lahore, where the 
average male offer jumped to 67 percent and nearly all males made hyper fair offers.  
As discussed earlier, the experiment design has certain confounding factors built 
in. Here, we cannot assess whether the increased offer is due to gender, or due to lack of 
anonymity. It is well established that subjects care about approval of the experimenter, as 
well as the approval of other subjects. For example, offers decrease substantially in 
anonymous Dictator games, compared to situations where the offer of the Dictator can be 
seen by others [Hoffmann, et al. (1994) and Franzen and Pointner (2012)]. Thus we can 
expect offers to increase from anonymous and blind setting of the first two rounds, when  
the responder sitting across the table changes. Thus, in the current experiment, it is 
impossible to say whether the increase in offer was a response to gender, or just a 
response to a human responder sitting across the table.  In fact, there are three possible 
explanations for the clearly observed increased offer by males in round 3.  
(1) Desire to please the opposite party, as well as the experimenter, in conformity 
with standards of chivalry and courtesy. 
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(2) According to local cultural norms, males are responsible financially for 
females. Recognition of this responsibility led to higher offers to females. 
(3) Courtship gestures, in conformity with the student culture governing cross 
gender interactions. 
It seems likely that a  mix of all three motives was involved.  Bicchieri (2006) 
argues that all forms of human interactions are governed by social norms, at least to some 
degree.  
 
Third Round Female Responses 
As we saw, all responders behaved in the same way regardless of gender or city in 
the first and second rounds. However, in the third round, the females clearly shifted the 
minimum acceptable offer upwards. Summary of the data evidence in this regards is as 
follows. 
In the first and second round, there are 43/130 = 33 percent and 46/130=35 percent 
offers below 38 percent. Rejections are 29/130 = 22.3 percent and 34/130 = 26 percent 
respectively. In this respect, there is not much difference between rounds 1 and 2. 
However, the male offers show a substantial increase from 40 percent to 49 percent in 
going from round 2 to round 3. This leads to a total of only 9/130 = 7 percent offers 
below 38. All 9 of these offers were rejected—the minimum acceptable offer for females 
is 40 percent in the third round. In rounds 1 and 2, 10 females accepted offers of 38 
percent or less, so the higher level of rejection in round 3 is a clear response to the 
treatment.  
Why did females raise their minimum acceptable offer to 40 percent? The simplest 
explanation is that low offers were viewed as discourteous, violating previously 
mentioned  norms of chivalry. It is well known that social norms are maintained by 
punishing violators within communities [Bicchieri (2006)].  So any perceived violation of 
local cultural norms was punished by rejections, even at cost to self-interest.  
 
Fourth Round Female Offers 
In fourth round females were asked to make offers within same pair to males. 
Average offers increased from 38 percent in first two rounds to 43 percent. It is clear that 
female offers increased significantly due to the treatment. Qualitatively, the number of 
females who increased their offers (105/130 = 81 percent) is similar to the numbers of 
males who increased their offers (114/130 = 88 percent). Quantitatively, the magnitude of 
the increase by females is around 5 percent, which is significantly less than the 9 percent 
increase by males. 
Due to experimental design we cannot differentiate between the following possible 
causes for the increase in the female offers in the fourth round:  
 Revelation of gender i.e. purely gender effect 
 Effect of being face to face i.e. peer pressure 
 Reciprocity just because of hyper fair offers in the third round as the pairs 
remained same for third and fourth round 
12 Naeem and Zaman 
 
While males made generous offers in the third round, they were not fully 
reciprocated by females on the fourth round. Razzaque (2009) mentions the most likely 
reason for the somewhat subdued response by females: high offers would be considered 
as forward and flirtatious behaviour, which is not socially acceptable within local cultural 
norms. Strong evidence for this is provided by the fact that there were 38 hyper fair offers 
by men, but only 4 hyper fair responses by females. All of the four female hyper fair 
responses were 55 percent, which is only slightly over the 50 percent boundary, while 
males offered 100 percent, 90 percent and similarly high proportions.    
 
Fourth Round Male Responses 
The acceptance/rejection behaviour by males in round 4 is shown in Figure 7. For 
comparison, this is super-imposed on top of the female acceptance/rejections in round 3. 
In general, the two pictures are similar. Overall, the males also increased their minimum 
acceptable offer to 40 percent, just like the females.1 While females accepted all offers of 
40 percent or above, among the males we find some rejections of offers between 40 
percent and 45 percent. A total of 48 percent of offers lie in this area, 85 percent of these 
are accepted and only 15 percent are rejected.2  In all such cases, the males made large 
offers (greater than 40 i.e., minimum accepted offers) and obviously expected 
reciprocation (this was also stated in post experiment interviews).  
 
Fig. 7.  Offers in Last Two Rounds 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, the goal of this article was to advocate the use of exploratory data analytic 
techniques, and graphical methods for obtaining an intuitive and visual understanding of 
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the data. As we have seen, these techniques provide a lot of new insights into the data set 
for ultimatum and gender previously handled by Razzaque (2009) using standard 
regression techniques, and formal statistical methods.  
Some of the key new findings were that there is a strong effect of urbanisation—
probably related to ease and comfort of cross-gender interactions on campus. The earlier 
finding of Razzaque (2009) that men are more generous than women is called into 
question; this behaviour is restricted to cross gender interactions in small cities, and may 
not generalise to the population as a whole. There is strong evidence of reciprocity, and 
strong gender effects of different types, which have been discussed in detail earlier. 
Because samples were small and non-random, and there were many untreated 
confounding factors, none of these results can be taken as conclusive. Indeed, this is one 
of the virtues of the exploratory data analysis techniques—it generates interesting 
hypotheses to explore in subsequent work. As we have seen, a number of hypotheses are 
generated by graphical analyses of the data. With a sharp hypothesis in hand and a pilot 
sample, it becomes possible to design a more scientific study with a randomised sample 
of planned size and careful controls for potential confounders. The confirmatory data 
analysis techniques which are studied in conventional econometrics courses are much 
better adapted to deal with such studies, as opposed to observational studies of the type 
done by Razzaque (2009). 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 
Comparison of Male Offers during First Two Rounds 
C12 N Mean SE StDev Min Q1 Med Q3 Max 
Ghizer R1 15 40.8 0.7 2.65 35 40 41 42 45 
Ghizer R2 15 40.5 1.9 7.37 30 35 40 50 50 
Kharan R1 15 41.6 0.7 2.77 35 40 42 43 45 
Kharan R2 15 41.3 1.9 7.43 30 35 40 50 50 
Lahore R1 5 39.0 4.0 8.94 30 30 40 47.5 50 
Lahore R2 5 52.0 2.5 5.70 45 47.5 50 57.5 60 
Nawab Shah R1 15 39.3 2.1 8.27 25 30 41 46 51 
Nawab Shah R2 15 39.4 2.0 7.80 28 31 43 46 50 
Rawala Kot R1 15 40.8 0.7 2.65 35 40 41 42 45 
Rawala Kot R2 15 40.5 1.9 7.37 30 35 40 50 50 
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